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Vortices Instead of Equilibria in MinMax Optimization:
Chaos and Butterfly Effects of Online Learning in Zero-Sum Games
Yun Kuen Cheung Georgios Piliouras
Singapore University of Technology and Design
“Strictly competitive games constitute one of the few areas in game theory, and indeed in
the social sciences, where a fairly sharp, unique prediction is made. . . . Early experiments
failed miserably to confirm the theory . . . A determined effort to design an experimental test
of minimax that . . . (succeeds) . . . was recently made. . . ” – Robert Aumann [1], 1987.
Abstract
We establish that algorithmic experiments in zero-sum games “fail miserably” to confirm the
unique, sharp prediction of maxmin equilibration. Contradicting nearly a century of economic
thought that treats zero-sum games nearly axiomatically as the exemplar symbol of economic sta-
bility, we prove that no meaningful prediction can be made about the day-to-day behavior of online
learning dynamics in zero-sum games. Concretely, Multiplicative Weights Updates (MWU) with
constant step-size is Lyapunov chaotic in the dual (payoff) space. Simply put, let’s assume that
an observer asks the agents playing Matching-Pennies whether they prefer Heads or Tails (and by
how much in terms of aggregate payoff so far). The range of possible answers consistent with any
arbitrary small set of initial conditions blows up exponentially with time everywhere in the payoff
space (Figure 1). This result is robust both algorithmically as well as game theoretically:
• Algorithmic robustness: Chaos is robust to agents using any of a general sub-family of Follow-
the-Regularized-Leader (FTRL) algorithms, the well known regret-minimizing dynamics, even
when agents mix-and-match dynamics, use different or slowly decreasing step-sizes.
• Game theoretic robustness: Chaos is robust to all affine variants of zero-sum games (strictly
competitive games), network variants with arbitrary large number of agents and even to compet-
itive settings beyond these.
Our result is in stark contrast with the time-average convergence of online learning to (approxi-
mate) Nash equilibrium, a result widely reported as “(weak) convergence to equilibrium”.
Figure 1: The von Neumann vortex: Volume expansion and chaos of MWU in Matching-Pennies.
(See Appendix A for explanation.)
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1 Introduction
Von Neumann’s seminal work on zero-sum games [28, 29] set the formal foundations of game theory, the
mathematical theory of coupled strategic behavior. The crowning jewel of his theory is the celebrated
minimax theorem that states that in zero-sum competitions each agent can in isolation compute a
safety strategy, the one that guarantees her, her maxmin payoff and moreover no possible improvement
over this minimal guarantee is possible given that the other agent also plays such a defensive, safety
minded strategy.
A cornerstone of economic theory, arguably its most resolute thesis, is that this prescribed solution
is indeed the only meaningful behavior in such a setting. Any rational self-interested learning/adaptive
behavior is bound to gravitate to this benign, static behavioral snapshot with both agents being dead-
locked at their maxmin strategies, or, minimally even if the system does not equilibrate all of the
necessary information needed to understand the system is represented by these efficiently computable,
effectively unique, system states.
The number of research threads that follow this kind of reasoning is too numerous to enumerate
here, but they effectively span all disciplines that study the subject, be it economics, (algorithmic) game
theory, online optimization, multi-agent systems, etc. In fact, the whole sub-field of studying learning
dynamics in games started with the work of [4] and [25] on fictitious play in zero-sum games, which
showed that the time-average of the agent behavior converges to their maxmin equilibria. Ever since
that first result a stream of followup works argue convergence of the time-average behavior (strate-
gies/payoffs) of online (e.g., regret-minimizing) learning dynamics in zero-sum games [12]. This line
of results represents the main frontier of our understanding of the effects of rational, self-interested
behavior in strictly competitive settings (see e.g., recent books [31, 5, 20, 26]).
As such, the time-average notion has been widely adopted from an algorithmic perspective. Focusing
on time-averages alone, however, can be rather misleading from a behavioral perspective. For example,
in a two-political-party competition, while the time-average of the political attitude might be moderate
which is widely interpreted as good, at different times it might swing between extremes of the political
spectrum which are all often interpreted as bad. In this context, where such competition can be modelled
as zero-sum game, the theoretical results in [2, 6] suggest that online learning are non-equilibrating, and
pushing parties’ political attitude towards extremes. Instability of equilibrium is also a major issue for
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) [15], a key application of zero-sum games in AI (see Related
Work). These examples illuminate the importance of developing a better understanding of the actual
behavior of game dynamics, instead of the time-averaged ones. As we shall see, our results showcase
the possibility of a more unpleasant phenomenon: online learning in games can be chaotic, impossible
to predict, at the polar opposite of the picture suggested by the celebrated minimax theorem.
Methodology — Volume Analysis. Our approach is a new methodology in the study of learning in
games: we analyze the volume changes of the learning algorithm. More precisely, given a set of starting
points with positive volume (Lebesgue measure), we analyze the change of the volume as the set is
evolved according to the learning algorithm. In Figure 1 we plot how a small neighbourhood around
the Nash Equilibrium (NE) (left figure) and one around a non-NE (right figure) are evolved over time
by the MWU algorithm; see Appendix A for more details on how the plots are produced.
We show in Sections 3 and 4 that the volume in the dual (payoff) space increases exponentially,
and as a result in the primal space (probability distributions over strategies) are moving away from
Nash and towards the boundary. Intuitively, let’s assume that an observer asks the agents playing
Matching-Pennies whether they prefer Heads or Tails (and by how much in terms of aggregate payoff
so far). The range of possible answers consistent with any arbitrary small set of initial conditions blows
up exponentially with time everywhere in the payoff space (Figure 1). Since the diameter of a set
is polynomially lower-bounded by its volume, our result formally implies Lyapunov chaos, a classical
notion to measure how chaotic a system is. It is measured by Lyapunov time, which can be informally
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defined as: when the starting point is perturbed by a distance of tiny amount of δ, for how long will
the trajectories of the two starting points remain within a distance of at most 2δ. Clearly, the shorter
the Lyapunov time, the more chaotic the system is. We show that the Lyapunov time of MWU in
zero-sum game is O(1/ǫ2), where ǫ is the step-size of the learning algorithm.
This result is robust both algorithmically as well as game theoretically :
• Algorithmic robustness: Chaos is robust to agents using any of a general sub-family of Follow-
the-Regularized-Leader (FTRL) algorithms, the well known regret-minimizing dynamics, even when
agents mix-and-match dynamics, use different or slowly decreasing step-sizes (Section 5).
• Game theoretic robustness: Chaos is robust to all affine network variants of zero-sum games
with arbitrary large number of agents (Section 6), and even to competitive settings beyond these
(Generalized Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) games in Section 7, and general 2 × 2 bimatrix game in
Section 8).
A Note About Human Behavior in Zero-sum Games. Our results are in stark contrast with
the standard interpretation of the behavior of regret minimizing dynamics in zero-sum games, which is
typically referred to as “converging to equilibrium”. Naturally, we cannot without careful behavioral
studies make a claim that human agents in practice adapt their beliefs according to MWU, gradient
descent, FTRL, or any other classic first-order optimization method. However, we can confidently
deduce a statement in the inverse direction. If as economic theory postulates (and Aumann’s quote
neatly summarizes) Nash equilibria in zero-sum games are indeed stable and moreover experimentally
verifiable, then this implies that human agents in practice must deviate robustly from the axiomatic
perspective of purely optimization driven dynamics as captured by gradient descent and variants and
apply carefully tailored equilibrium-seeking behavioral dynamics. Moreover, this is a cross-cultural
behavioral universal.
Related Work. Eshel and Akin [11] were the first to point out that replicator dynamics are volume-
preserving after a transformation. In this paper, we will mostly use a slightly different transformation,
except for general 2× 2 bimatrix games we use their transformation. Recent work on continuous time
dynamics in (variants of) zero-sum games has established that such dynamics exhibit recurrent, cycle-
like behavior, e.g., replicator in network zero-sum games [24], periodic orbits in team zero-sum games
[23] and finally recurrence for all FTRL dynamics in affine variants of network zero-sum games [19].
Progress in discrete-time dynamics has been much slower but recently based on the above results,
Bailey and Piliouras [2] and Cheung [6] independently developed non-equilibration analysis for all
FTRL dynamics and MWU dynamics respectively in zero-sum games.
The two prior work [2, 6] showed that in a zero-sum game, MWU dynamic diverges from any
fully-mixed NE; more precisely, they showed that the KL-divergence between the current point and
the fully-mixed NE strictly increases. Consequently, the ω-set for any starting point which is not
NE must be a subset of the boundary of the strategy space. The main concern of the prior work
is instability of the dynamics, while our current work focuses on chaos and unpredictability — these
provide an entirely new, rather intuitive and convincing argument against not only Nash equilibria but
the misconception that zero-sum games are “easy”. “Predictability” is a general target in any branch
of science, and particularly so in dynamical systems. To clarify that “unpredictability” is conceptually
different from instability, we use the classical example of weather forecast. It is common sense that
weather changes day-to-day, so saying it is unstable is nothing but a tautology. What is more surprising
is its unpredictability (butterfly effect), namely a small change in initial conditions and environmental
factors can lead to significant difference in the outcomes. Our work is able to spot out and utilise the
(geometric) volume measure, which can be viewed as a summary measure on capturing the effects of
perturbation in all dimensions. In contrast, the analyses in [2, 6] can be viewed as focusing on an
one-dimensional projection (the KL-divergence) of the dynamics, and clearly had not exploited the
richer geometric structures of the dynamics.
By showing that the volumes increase exponentially, a result similar to the ω-set-inside-boundary
result in [2, 6] can be derived. One advantage of our approach is it does not need to distinguish
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between cases on whether a fully-mixed NE exists or not; however, the statement we can make here
will be slightly weaker1. A more compelling advantage is that this approach leads to a global instability
result of NE in RPS games (see Theorem 12).
There have been work reporting observations of chaos even in simple games. Sato et al. [27] focused
on a class of RPS games which contains some zero-sum games; the two players employ the continuous-
time replicator dynamics. They ran numerical simulations to find that for those zero-sum games, the
dynamics are chaotic with finite Lyapunov time. Galla and Farmer [13] focused on random two-player
games where the payoffs to the two players can be positively or negatively correlated; zero-sum games
belong to the negatively correlated regime. They considered a spectrum of discrete reinforcement
learning dynamics, which includes MWU. Their simulations suggest experimentally that for negatively
correlated games MWU exhibit chaos. We provide a theoretical underpinning for these phenomena
for a wide spectrum of dynamics and games. Palaiopanos et al. [22] and Chotibut et al. [7] studied
MWU and its variant in congestion games. While MWU with very small constant step-size converges to
equilibrium in such games, they showed if we increase the step-size MWU becomes chaotic in a notion
first defined by Li and Yorke [17]. Hence chaotic behavior may be provably verifiable even outside
strictly competitive games.
A stream of recent papers proves positive results about convergence to equilibria in (mostly bilinear,
unconstrained) zero-sum games for suitably adapted variants of first-order methods and then apply
these techniques to Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs), showing improved performance. One
such adapted dynamics are extra-gradient lookahead “optimistic” methods [8]. Constrained zero-sum
game optimization (e.g. simplex constrained strategies, normal form games) are much harder to ad-
dress theoretically and only recent work has addressed even the special case of optimistic MWU [10].
[3] exploit conservation laws of learning dynamics in zero-sum games (e.g., [24, 19]) to develop new
algorithms for training GANs that add a new component to the dynamic that aims at minimising
this energy function. Different energy shrinking techniques for convergence even in non-convex saddle
point problems exploit connections to variational inequalities and employ mirror descent techniques
with an extra gradient step [18]. Time-averaging seems to work well in practice for a wide range of
architectures, although without necessarily leading to convergence [30]. Finally, [14] provide negative
momentum adapted dynamics that add friction to the dynamics. To re-quote Aumann [1], determined
efforts are being made once again to make zero-sum games fit their historically prescribed roles as
equilibrium generators, however, zero-sum games are fighting back. For example, optimistic gradient
methods as they pressure the system towards stability can end up stabilising even points that are not
local min-max solutions, i.e., non-Nash solutions [9]. Our paper showing universal chaos for first order
methods in bilinear zero-sum games should be seen as a cautionary tale about the true unpredictability
and hardness of training GANs. Not only do we have a long road ahead of us before we have a cor-
rect understanding of the behavior of training algorithms for GANs but more distressingly a thorough
understanding might be downright impossible due to emergence of chaos.
2 Preliminary
In this paper, all vectors are denoted by bold lower-case alphabets, and all matrices are denoted
by bold upper-case alphabets. We write 1n for the all-one vector in R
n, or we simply write 1 if
the dimension is clear from context. Given a vector z = (z1, z2, · · · , zn), if ‖z‖1 =
∑n
j=1 zj 6= 0,
we say the normalization of z is the vector z/‖z‖1. Let spani∈I(zi) := maxi∈I(zi) − mini∈I(zi). Let
∆n :=
{
(z1, z2, · · · , zn)
∣∣∣ ∀j ∈ [n], zj ≥ 0, and ∑nj=1 zj = 1}. For any positive integer a, [a] denotes
the set {1, 2, · · · , a}.
Dynamical System, System of Differential Equations and Jacobian. A dynamical system
is typically described by a system of differential equations over time in Rd, governed by d differential
equations on the variables z1, z2, · · · , zd, which are of the form dzjdt = Fj(z1, z2, · · · , zd), for j ∈ [d]. Given
1The statement is: in every open subset in the primal space, there exists a starting point which will eventually get
close to the boundary. See Corollaries 5 and 6.
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a starting point (z◦1 , z
◦
2 , · · · , z◦d), the values of the variables at any time t ≥ 0 are typically uniquely
determined; precisely, given the starting point, for each j ∈ [d], there is a function zj : R+ → R such
that altogether they satisfy the system of differential equations, with (z1(0), z2(0), · · · , zd(0)) being the
starting point. The collection of such functions is called the trajectory of the given starting point. The
flow of a given starting point at time t is simply (z1(t), z2(t), · · · , zd(t)). In this paper, we assume that
the functions Fj are smooth everywhere.
Given a measurable set S and a system of differential equations, the flow of S at time t is the
collection of the flows of all starting points in S at time t; when the underlying dynamical system is
clear from context, we denote it by S(t). Let volume(S) denote the Lebesgue volume of a measurable
set S. In the rest of this paper, all sets S are assumed to be measurable and bounded.
The Jacobian of the system is a d × d-matrix, with the entry in the i-th row and j-th column be
∂Fi
∂zj
.
Lyapunov Chaos. In the study of dynamical systems, Lyapunov chaos refer generally to following
phenomenon in some systems: a tiny difference in the starting points can yield widely diverging out-
comes quickly. A classical measure of chaos is Lyapunov time, which can be defined as: when the
starting point is perturbed by a distance of tiny δ, for how long will the trajectories of the two starting
points remain within a distance of at most 2δ.
Replicator Dynamics. In game setting, Replicator Dynamic (RD) is a continuous-time update rule
on a probability distribution over strategies. Such distribution can be naturally denoted by a strategy
vector. Briefly speaking, in RD, the relative change of a probability density in a strategy vector is same
as the payoff from that strategy minus the average payoff at the current probability distribution.
In two-person bimatrix game setting, where the payoffs of the two players are given by matrices
A,B respectively, let the strategy set of Players 1 and 2 be J and K respectively, and let n = |J |,
m = |K|. We denote a strategy vector of Players 1 and 2 be x ∈ ∆n and y ∈ ∆m respectively.
Then RD is governed by the following system of differential equations:
dxj
dt
= xj
[
(Ay)j −
∑
ℓ∈J
x
ℓ
· (Ay)
ℓ
]
dyk
dt
= yk
[
(BTx)k −
∑
ℓ∈K
y
ℓ
· (BTx)
ℓ
]
. (1)
We follow convention by assuming that every entry in A,B is within the interval ±1.
2.1 A Transformation of Replicator Dynamics
Next, we discuss a crucial transformation of RD system (1). This transformation is motivated by the
standard implementation of the discrete analogue of RD, the MWU algorithm.
In MWU, for Player 1 and each of her strategies j, there is an initial weight W ◦j ∈ R. There is no
constraint on the initial and subsequent weights. At time t, the weights (W t1 ,W
t
2, · · · ,W tn) correspond
to a strategy vector xt, which is the normalization of the vector(
exp(ǫ ·W t1) , exp(ǫ ·W t2) , · · · , exp(ǫ ·W tn)
)
.
For Player 2, the strategy vector yt is defined similarly.
After each round, the weight of each strategy j is updated by incrementing the value of the payoff
to strategy j in that round. In two-player bimatrix game setting, the update rule is
W t+1j := W
t
j + [Ay
t]j . (2)
Observe that (W Tj −W ◦j ) is the cumulative payoff of Player 1 if she were to choose strategy j with
certainty in the first t time steps, while Player 2 were assumed to stick with the choices {yt}t=1···T .
The weights of Player 2 are updated similarly.
Now we are ready to describe the transformation. The resulting space has dimension n+m, which
we call the dual space or the cumulative payoff space. The space before transformation will be called
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the primal space. Let pj for j ∈ [n], and let qk for k ∈ [m] be the variables in the dual space; p and
q are analogous to the weight vectors of Players 1 and 2 in the MWU algorithm respectively. We will
write r = (p,q).
The transformation from the dual space to the primal space is done via the map
G : r = (p,q) → concatenation of normalizations of (ep1 , ep2 , · · · , epn ) and (eq1 , eq2 , · · · , eqm ).
Observe that G is not one-to-one, but it is easy to see that G(p1,q1) = G(p2,q2) if and only if
p1 − p2 = c1 · 1 and q1 − q2 = c2 · 1 for some real numbers c1, c2.
Then consider the system
dpj
dt
=
∑
ℓ∈S2
Ajℓ · e
q
ℓ∑
z∈S2 e
qz
dqk
dt
=
∑
ℓ∈S1
Bℓk · e
p
ℓ∑
z∈S1 e
pz
. (3)
We note the similarity between the above system and the MWU update rule (2). It is easy to show
that system (3) is equivalent to the system (1), as stated precisely in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Let (p1,q1) and (p2,q2) be two vectors in R
n+m such that p1 − p2 = c1 · 1 and
q1 − q2 = c2 · 1 for some real numbers c1, c2. Then the two trajectories obtained from the system (3)
with starting points (p1,q1) and (p2,q2) are identical after transformation G, which is identical to the
trajectory of the RD system (1) with starting point G(p1,q1) = G(p2,q2).
The system (3) is useful since all diagonal entries in its Jacobian are always zero, a property that
leads to volume preservation, which we discuss next.
2.2 Liouville’s Formula and Volume Preservation
Determinant. Given a d × d squared-matrix M, its determinant is given by the Leibniz formula
det(M) =
∑
σ∈Perm([d]) sgn(σ) ·
∏d
s=1Ms,σ(s), where Perm([d]) is the collection of all permutations on
[d], and sgn(σ) is the sign of the permutation σ. Recall from college calculus that determinant computes
the signed volume of the parallelepiped spanned by its d column vectors.
The following fact, which follows easily from the Leibniz formula, will be useful. Suppose that the
rows and columns of M are indexed by union of two sets J,K, and M can be written as
M = I+ Z, such that ∀j1, j2 ∈ J, Zj1j2 = 0 and ∀k1, k2 ∈ K, Zk1k2 = 0.
Furthermore, for any j ∈ J, k ∈ K, Zjk = Cjkǫ for some Cjk ∈ R, and Zkj = Ckjǫ for some Ckj ∈ R.
Then det(M) is a polynomial of ǫ of degree at most 2 ·min{|J |, |K|}, and
det(M) = 1 −

 ∑
j∈J, k∈K
Cjk · Ckj

 ǫ2 + O(ǫ4); (4)
we note that the coefficient of any odd power of ǫ is zero.
Liouville’s Formula. Here, we discuss the necessary ingredient for this paper about Liouville’s For-
mula, and refer readers to [21] for a more elaborate discussion. Any dynamical system with sum of
diagonal entries in its Jacobian always zero is called a divergence-free system.
Theorem 2. Let h˙ = E(h) be a system of differential equations on Rd. Let S ≡ S(0) ⊂ Rd be a
bounded and measurable set. ∂E∂h is the Jacobian of the system. Then
d volume(S(t))
dt =
∫
S trace
(
∂E
∂h
)
dV .
In particular, if the system is divergence-free, then volume is preserved.
We will need some elements in a proof of Theorem 2 to proceed. The proof uses integration for
substitution for multi-variables and Taylor expansion. To apply the former, we need to make sure that
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for discrete updates, the flow from S(t) to S(t+1) is injective2. In Appendix B, we prove that ǫ < 1/4
suffices to guarantee this for MWU in two-person general-sum game; indeed, the proof covers graphical
polymatrix games too, with a smaller upper bound on ǫ. The proof uses an appropriate variant of the
inverse function theorem.
At time 0, the solution to the system of ODEs can be locally written as
h(t) = φt(h(0)) = h(0) + t ·E(h(0)) + O(t2), (5)
while volume at time t can be computed by
v(t) =
∫
S
det
(
∂φt
∂h
)
dV =
∫
S
det
(
I+ t · ∂E
∂h
+O(t2)
)
dV,
in which I is the identity matrix. By expanding the determinant in the RHS, we have
v(t)− volume(S) =
∫
S
(
1 + t · trace
(
∂E
∂h
)
+O(t2)
)
dV −
∫
S
1 dV
=
∫
S
(
t · trace
(
∂E
∂h
)
+O(t2)
)
dV.
Dividing both sides by t, and taking the appropriate limit as tց 0 completes the proof.
Exponentially Increasing Volume. Here we focus on MWU discrete-time updates with step-size
ǫ. We may view a MWU update as equivalent to a continuous-time dynamic in the time interval [0, ǫ],
with the function value E unchanged during the updates within this time interval. Consequently, the
O(t2) term in (5), which was to account for the changes in E, disappears. By following the above
computations, given a measurable set S, and let S′ be the flow of S after one time step, we have
volume(S′) =
∫
s∈S
det
(
I+ ǫ · ∂E(s)
∂h
)
dV. (6)
If one can show that there exists a δ > 0 such that for all s ∈ S, the integrand is at least 1 + δ, then
we have volume(S′) ≥ (1 + δ) · volume(S). If this holds in every time step, then the volume increases
exponentially at a rate of at least (1 + δ)t.
Interpreting Chaos from Volume Increase. Here, we discuss how analyzing volume can be related
to chaos and Lyapunov time. In Rd for some fixed d ∈ N, the volume of a ball with radius r is strictly
less than 2drd. Thus, if the volume of a set S is v, then the following holds: for any s ∈ S, there is an
s′ ∈ S such that ‖s − s′‖ > v1/d/2.
If in a dynamical system on Rd, a set S evolves over time with exponentially increasing volume, and
suppose the rate of increase is at least (1+ δ)t. Then the following holds: for any starting point s0 ∈ S,
let its flow at time t be st, and let r¯(s0, t) denote the ℓ2 distance from st to the furthest point in the
set S(t). Then r¯(d0, t) = Ω((1 + δ)
t/d) = Ω((1 + δ/d)t), which is again exponential of t. Consequently,
the Lyapunov time is at most O(d/δ). In all of our results, δ = Θ(ǫ2), so the Lyapunov time is at most
O(1/ǫ2) by considering the dimension d as a fixed constant.
3 Volume Change of Discrete Multiplicative Weights Updates
Next, we consider the discrete analogue of the system (3), which is exactly the MWU algorithm with
step-size ǫ. Our calculations in this section are for two-person general-sum games, where A,B can be
arbitrary.
Following the notation in Theorem 2, we rewrite the system (3) as r˙ = E(r), where r = (p,q).
MWU algorithm is then equivalent to the vector-form update rule φ(r) = r+ ǫ ·E(r). By (6), we are
interested in the determinant of the following matrix:
M ≡ M(r) := I+ ǫ · ∂E
∂r
.
2This holds automatically for continuous updates for the flow from S(t) to S(t+∆t) for a sufficiently small ∆t, when
E is continuously differentiable and S(t) is bounded.
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Observe that ∂E∂r has the properties of the matrix Z appeared in Section 2.2. Thus, det(M), which is
the integrand in (6), is of the form 1+C(r) · ǫ2+O(ǫ4), where C(r) can be computed using (4). Hence,
when ǫ is sufficiently small, the value of C(r) will be decisive for volume change. Clearly, C(r) is a
function of r, but we shall see that it is actually a function of G(r), the corresponding primal variables.
Next, we compute C(r) explicitly for two-person general-sum games. Recall that M is a (J ∪K)×
(J ∪K) squared matrix. Let (x,y) = G(r). Due to the structure of ∂E∂r , all diagonal entries of M are
1. For any distinct j1, j2 ∈ J and distinct k1, k2 ∈ K, Mj1j2 ,Mk1,k2 = 0. For j ∈ J and k ∈ K, we have
Mjk = ǫ · ∂
∂qk
(∑
ℓ∈K Ajℓ · e
qℓ∑
z∈K e
qz
)
= ǫ
(
Ajk · eqk∑
z∈K e
qz
−
∑
ℓ∈K Ajℓ · e
qℓ · eqk(∑
z∈K e
qz
)2
)
= ǫyk · (Ajk − [Ay]j). (7)
Analogously, Mkj = ǫxj · (Bjk − [BTx]k). By (4),
C(r) = −
∑
j∈J, k∈K
xjyk · (Ajk − [Ay]j) · (Bjk − [BTx]k).
As promised, C(r) eventually depends on (x,y) = G(r) only, but not explicitly on r = (p,q). Expand-
ing the RHS yields:
C(r) = −
∑
j∈J, k∈K
xjykAjkBjk +
∑
j∈J
xj · [Ay]j ·
∑
k∈K
ykBjk
+
∑
k∈K
yk · [BTx]k ·
∑
j∈J
xjAjk −

∑
j∈J
xj · [Ay]j

(∑
k∈K
yk · [BTx]k
)
. (8)
4 Exponentially Increasing Volume in Two-Person Zero-sum Games
Lemma 3. In any two-person zero-sum game (A,−A), at any point r in which each entry is a finite
number, C(r) ≥ 0. Furthermore, the equality holds if and only if the game matrix A can be written in
the following form for some real numbers a1, a2, · · · , an, b1, b2, · · · , bm:
A =


a1 − b1 a1 − b2 · · · a1 − bm
a2 − b1 a2 − b2 · · · a2 − bm
...
...
. . .
...
an − b1 an − b2 · · · an − bm

 . (9)
Before proving the lemma, we point out that a zero-sum game with matrix (9) is “trivial”, since
both players have a dominant strategy: for Player 1, the dominant strategy is argmaxj∈J aj , while the
dominant strategy of Player 2 is argmaxk∈K bk. In this case, the limit behaviour of MWU is easy to
derive: eventually, each player will play exclusively on her own dominant strategy.
Proof. For a two-person zero-sum game, Bjk = −Ajk. By (8),
C(r) =
∑
j∈J, k∈K
xjyk(Ajk)
2 −
∑
j∈J
xj·([Ay]j)2 −
∑
k∈K
yk·([BTx]k)2 −

∑
j∈J
xj · [Ay]j

(∑
k∈K
yk · [BTx]k
)
.
We consider an underlying probability distribution where the tuple (j, k) is chosen with probability
xjyk. Then we can write
C(r) = E
[
(Ajk)
2 − ([Ay]j)2 − ([BTx]k)2
]
− E
[
[Ay]j
]
· E
[
[BTx]k
]
.
Next, note that E
[
[Ay]j
]
=
∑
j∈J xj · [Ay]j is the expected payoff to Player 1, while E
[
[BTx]k
]
is
the expected payoff to Player 2. In a two-person zero-sum game, the two values are negative to each
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other. Let v := E
[
[Ay]j
]
. Then C(r) = E
[
(Ajk)
2 − ([Ay]j)2 − ([BTx]k)2
]
+ v2. On the other hand,
note that
E [Ajk] =
∑
j∈J
xj
∑
k∈K
ykAjk =
∑
j∈J
xj · [Ay]j = v.
Then by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,
v2 = E
[
Ajk − [Ay]j + [BTx]k
]2
≤ E
[(
Ajk − [Ay]j + [BTx]k
)2]
.
The RHS is expanded as below:
E
[
(Ajk)
2
]
+ E
[
([Ay]j)
2
]
+ E
[
([BTx]k)
2
]
− 2·E [Ajk · [Ay]j ] + 2·E
[
Ajk · [BTx]k
]
− 2·E
[
[Ay]j · [BTx]k
]
.
Next, we simplify the last three terms in the RHS.
E [Ajk · [Ay]j ] =
∑
j∈J
xj · [Ay]j ·
∑
k∈K
ykAjk =
∑
j∈J
xj · ([Ay]j)2 = E
[
([Ay]j)
2
]
;
E
[
Ajk · [BTx]k
]
=
∑
k∈K
yk · [BTx]k ·
∑
j∈J
xjAjk = −
∑
k∈K
yk · ([BTx]k)2 = − E
[
([BTx]k)
2
]
.
Since the underlying distribution is the product distribution induced by x and y, we also have
E
[
[Ay]j · [BTx]k
]
= E [[Ay]j ] · E
[
[BTx]k
]
= − v2.
Combining all above yields
v2 ≤ E [(Ajk)2] − E [([Ay]j)2] − E [([BTx]k)2] + 2v2 = C(r) + v2,
completing the proof of the first part of the lemma.
To prove the second part of the lemma, first note that since the entries in r are all finite numbers,
(x,y) = G(r) are fully-mixed. Thus, in the application of the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality above, it is
tight if and only if Ajk − [Ay]j + [BTx]k are identical for all j ∈ J and k ∈ K. Next, we prove that the
latter condition holds if and only if A has the form of (9):
(⇐) By a direction computation, we have Ajk − [Ay]j + [BTx]k =
∑
ℓ∈K bℓyℓ −
∑
ℓ∈J aℓxℓ , which is
identical for all j ∈ J, k ∈ K.
(⇒) Suppose that at some r we have Ajk− [Ay]j +[BTx]k = d for all j ∈ J, k ∈ K. Then each Ajk can
be written as d+ [Ay]j − [BTx]k. We are done by setting aj = d+ [Ay]j and bk = [BTx]k in (9).
4.1 Substantial Exponential Factor of Volume Increment
Our next target is to show that the second-order coefficient C(r) is bounded away from zero under
suitable conditions. To begin, we first let
R(δ) := { r | every entry in G(r) is at least δ } .
Observe that for any r ∈ R(δ), (x,y) = G(r) are fully-mixed, and every product xjyk ≥ δ2.
Recall that C(r) can be zero only when the underlying zero-sum game is trivial. Thus, naturally, a
lower bound on C(r) will depend on the distance between the game matrix A and the family of those
trivial matrices. Accordingly, we consider the parameter
c(A) := min
a1,a2,··· ,an,b1,b2,··· ,bm∈R
span
j∈J,k∈K
(Ajk − aj + bk) .
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When applying the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality above, observe that the gap between the inequality,
which is
(
E
[(
Ajk − [Ay]j + [BTx]k
)2]− E [Ajk − [Ay]j + [BTx]k]2), is indeed the variance of the
random variable (Ajk − [Ay]j + [BTx]k), and is known to be identical to
E
[(
Ajk − [Ay]j + [BTx]k − E
[
Ajk − [Ay]j + [BTx]k
])2]
.
Thus, by the definition of c(A), in R(δ), the gap is at least δ2 · (c(A)/2)2 = δ2 · c(A)2/4.
After having a concrete lower bound on C(r), we will still need to bound the higher order terms.
Recall that det(M) can be written in the form 1 + Cǫ2 + O(ǫ4). We need a more explicit expansion
using the Leibniz formula to bound the higher-order terms.
For each min{n,m} ≥ i ≥ 2, there are at most (ni) · (mi ) · (i!)2 terms in the summation of the Leibniz
formula with factor ǫ2i. Each of such terms is a product of 2i off-diagonal entries of M, while the
absolute value of each such entry ofM can be bounded by 2ǫ. Overall, the sum of all terms with factor
ǫ2i is bounded by
(n
i
) · (mi ) · (i!)2 · (2ǫ)2i ≤ (2ǫ√nm)2i. Thus,
det(M)− 1 ≥ C(r) · ǫ2 −
∞∑
i=2
(2ǫ
√
nm)2i ≥ δ
2 · c(A)2
4
· ǫ2 − ǫ3 [(2√nm)4ǫ+ (2√nm)6ǫ3 + · · · ]
When ǫ ≤ 1/(32n2m2), we have (2√nm)4ǫ+ (2√nm)6ǫ3 + · · · ≤ 1. Consequently, when
ǫ ≤ min{1/(32n2m2) , δ2 · c(A)2/8}, we have det(M) ≥ 1 + δ2·c(A)28 · ǫ2.
Theorem 4. For a fixed δ > 0, let S ≡ S(0) ⊂ Rm+n be a measurable set in R(δ). Suppose that MWU
algorithm is used by both players to play a non-trivial two-person zero-sum game, with
ǫ ≤ min{1/(32n2m2) , δ2c(A)2/8} =: ǫ¯(δ).
Let T be a time such that for all t ∈ {0} ∪ [T − 1], S(t) ⊂ R(δ). Then for any t ∈ [T ],
volume(S(t)) ≥
(
1 +
δ2 · c(A)2
8
· ǫ2
)t
· volume(S).
Consequently, the Lyapunov time of the system before reaching R(δ) is at most O(1/(δ2ǫ2)), where the
hidden constant depends on the game matrix A only.
The interpretation of the above theorem is: as long as the MWU algorithm with some sufficiently
small step-size remains in some strict interior of the primal space, the volume of the flow of MWU in
the dual space increases exponentially with a rate of at least (1 + Θ(ǫ2))t.
4.2 Reaching Boundary: Exponential Lower Bound vs. Polynomial Upper Bound
on Volume
Theorem 4 leaves one question: for how long will S(t) stay within R(δ). To answer this question, a key
observation is that in the dual space, in every time step of the MWU flow, each entry of p,q will change
within the interval ±ǫ. Hence, unconditionally (not only for zero-sum games, but also for general-sum
games), S(t) must be a subset of the following rectangular hyper-box:{
(p,q) | ∀j ∈ J, min
p∈S
p0j − ǫt ≤ pj ≤ max
p∈S
p0j + ǫt and ∀k ∈ K, min
q∈S
q0k − ǫt ≤ qk ≤ max
q∈S
q0k + ǫt
}
.
Consequently, the volume of S(t) is unconditionally upper bounded by O((ǫt)m+n); note that this
bound is O(poly(t)) by viewing m,n, ǫ as fixed parameters.
However, the volume lower bound in Theorem 4 is exponential in t. Thus, the upper and lower
bounds are incompatible when t gets large, implying that S(t) can only stay within R(δ) for at most
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the first positive root t of the following equation:
(
1 +
δ2 · c(A)2
8
· ǫ2
)t
· volume(S) =

2ǫt + max
{
span
p∈S,j∈J
p0j , span
q∈S,k∈K
q0k
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
γ


m+n
. (10)
Note that when t = 0, the LHS is strictly less than the RHS, since S is strictly contained in a hypercube
of side length γ. Also, when tր∞, the LHS is asymptotically larger than the RHS. Thus, a positive
root of the equation must exist.
Corollary 5. For a fixed δ, let S ≡ S(0) ∈ Rm+n be a measurable subset in R(δ). Suppose that MWU
are used by both players to play a zero-sum game which is non-trivial, with step-size ǫ ≤ ǫ¯(δ). Then
there exists a starting point in S such that before the time of first positive root of (10), its flow reaches
the outside of R(δ). Consequently, there is a dense set of starting points in R(δ) which their flows will
eventually reach the outside of R(δ).
Indeed, the same argument holds so long as the volume lower bound on the LHS of (10) is ω(tm+n).
This allows us to generalize to MWU algorithm with diminishing step-sizes. We present the analogous
corollary here, and defer the details to Appendix C.1.
Corollary 6. For a fixed δ, let S ≡ S(0) ∈ Rm+n be a bounded measurable set in the dual space.
Suppose that MWU are used by both players to play a zero-sum game which is not uninteresting, with
diminishing step-size {ǫt} satisfying
ǫ1 <
1
4
and lim
t→∞ ǫt < ǫ¯(δ) and lim supt→∞
∑t
τ=1(ǫτ )
2
log t
>
16(m + n)
δ2 · c(A)2 .
Then there exists a starting point in S such that its flow will eventually reach the outside of R(δ);
consequently, there is a dense set of starting points which their flows will eventually reach the outside
of R(δ).
The conditions on {ǫt} can be satisfied by a step-size sequence which is asymptotically like those
used in regret minimization: ǫt = min
{
1
4+κ1
, 4
√
m+n+κ2
δ·c(A) · 1√t
}
= Θ
(
1√
t
)
, where κ1, κ2 > 0.
We note that while Theorem 4 is a novel type of result, Corollaries 5 and 6 are weaker than the main
results in [2, 6]. However, the proofs presented here avoids the need to distinguish between games with
fully-mixed NE or not. Corollary 5 also provides an explicit time bound (the first positive root of (10))
for reaching the boundary. More importantly, in Section 7, we will see that the technique (exponential
lower bound vs. polynomial upper bound) used for proving the two corollaries can be generalized to
prove some novel and interesting results about some Rock-Paper-Scissors games (for eager readers,
please see Theorem 12).
5 Generalization to the Follow-The-Regularized-Leader Algorithm
Recall that in the dual space, the vectors p,q can be viewed as the cumulative payoffs in a two-person
game. Here, we use pi ∈ Rni to denote the cumulative payoff vector of Player i. The Follow-The-
Regularized-Leader (FTRL) dynamic with step-size ǫ is determined by a convex regularizer function
hi : ∆
ni → R. In each round, the payoff vector pi is converted to probability distribution by:
xti ← argmax
xi∈∆ni
{ 〈
pti , xi
〉 − 1
ǫ
· hi(xi)
}
.
We note that MWU is a special case of FTRL, by setting hi(xi) =
∑
ℓ∈Si xiℓ · lnxiℓ.
Using this more general update rule, the results presented in this section can extend to settings
where
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• players use MWU with different step-sizes: we just need to scale up or down the players’ regularizer
functions by constant factors;
• different players using different diminishing-step-sizes, since our volume analysis can actually permit
the regularizer functions be changed over time (so long as they do not violate the requirements we will
impose soon); recall that Bailey and Piliouras [2] imposed a requirement on the step-size sequences
used by different players;
• different players mix-and-match dynamics, i.e., the players can use entirely different types of regu-
larizers.
In zero-sum games, we want to reproduce an analysis for general FTRL as in Section 4. In full
generality it is rather clumsy. Thus, we focus on the special cases when
• hi(xi) =
∑
j∈Si hij(xij) is separable and second-continuously-differentiable in the relative interior of
the primal space;
• for all xij > 0, h′′ij(xij) is strictly positive, i.e., hij is strictly convex; and
• the corresponding FTRL dynamic guarantees xi stays full-mixed.3
In Appendix D, we show that by letting x¯iℓ = 1/h
′′(xiℓ) and H :=
∑
ℓ∈Si x¯iℓ, we have
∂xij
∂pij
= x¯ij − [x¯ij ]
2
H
and ∀ℓ ∈ Si \ {j}, ∂xiℓ
∂pij
= − x¯ij x¯iℓ
H
. (11)
Next, we explain how the previous analyses in this paper can be generalized to FTRL algorithm in
two-person zero-sum games.
Two-person Zero-sum Game. Again, we focus on showing C(r) ≥ 0, and defer all other details and
result statements to Appendix D. Recall the system (3), which we rewrite here:
dpj
dt
=
∑
ℓ∈K
Ajℓ · yℓ and
dqk
dt
=
∑
ℓ∈J
Bℓk · xℓ .
Keep in mind that here x is a function of p while y is a function of q, which we do not write out
explicitly for two reasons: first, the explicit formula might be complicated, and second, for the need of
computing the Jacobian of the system, knowing (11) suffices. As in Section 3, in the matrix M, the
diagonal entries are all 1, and Mj1j2 = Mk1k2 = 0 for any distinct j1, j2 ∈ J and distinct k1, k2 ∈ K.
For j ∈ J, k ∈ K, by (11),
Mjk = ǫ ·
∂(
∑
ℓ∈K Ajℓ · yℓ)
∂qk
= ǫ ·
(
Ajky¯k − y¯k ·
∑
ℓ∈K
Ajℓ · y¯ℓ∑
z∈K y¯z
)
= ǫy¯k
(
Ajk −
∑
ℓ∈K
Ajℓ · y¯ℓ∑
z∈K y¯z
)
.
By comparing the above equality with (7), the summation in the RHS of above equality is analogous to
[Ay]j . Similarly, Mkj = ǫx¯j(Bjk −
∑
ℓ∈J Bℓk ·
x¯
ℓ∑
z∈J x¯z
), with the summation here analogous to [BTx]k
in the MWU case.
To proceed, we consider C(r)
/[(∑
j∈J x¯j
) (∑
k∈K y¯k
)]
. This quantity is identical to the one given
in (8), except that each xj is replaced by x¯j/
(∑
j∈J x¯j
)
and each yk is replaced by y¯k/
(∑
k∈K y¯k
)
. Note
that coincidentally, the replaced values form two probability distributions over J and K respectively,
which we call them the shadow distributions of their corresponding FTRL update rule (see formal
definition below). Therefore, all the arithmetic using expectations that leads to Lemma 3 carries
through smoothly to prove that C(r)
/[(∑
j∈J x¯j
) (∑
k∈K y¯k
)] ≥ 0 and hence C(r) ≥ 0, while equality
holds if and only if A has the form (9).
3This condition holds if limxijց0 h
′
ij(xij) = −∞ for all i, j.
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Definition 7. Given a FTRL update rule with hi(xi) =
∑
j∈Si hij(xij) are separable and second-
differentiable in the relative interior of the primal space, such that the update guarantees xi stays
full-mixed. The shadow distribution of the FTRL update rule at xi is the distribution in which each
j ∈ Si is realized with probability
1/h′′ij(xij)∑
ℓ∈Si 1/h
′′
iℓ(xiℓ)
.
The remaining analyses are spiritually identical to those presented in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, although
some details (e.g., conditions for guaranteeing that a FTRL algorithm is injective) are different. We
defer them to Appendix D but present the results here. Let
H(δ) := max
r∈R(δ)
max

∑
j∈J
x¯j ,
∑
k∈K
y¯k

 .
Also, let ∆(δ) denote the minimum possible value in the shadow distributions of any (x,y) = G(r),
where r ∈ R(δ). We note that ∆(δ) is strictly positive for any δ.
Theorem 8. For a fixed δ > 0, let S ≡ S(0) ∈ Rm+n be a measurable subset in R(δ). Suppose that
MWU algorithm is used by both players to play a non-trivial two-person zero-sum game, with step-size
ǫ ≤ min


1
2 ·max{2,H(δ)}4 · n2m2 ,
∆(δ)2 · c(A)2
8
,
1
4 ·H(δ/2) ,
δ
9
· min
z≥δ/2
i∈{1,2}
j∈Si
h′′ij(z)

 .
Let T be a time such that for all t ∈ {0} ∪ [T − 1], S(t) ⊂ R(δ). Then for any t ∈ [T ],
volume(S(t)) ≥
(
1 +
∆(δ)2 · c(A)2
8
· ǫ2
)t
· volume(S).
Consequently, the Lyapunov time of the system before reaching R(δ) is at most O(1/(∆(δ)2 ·ǫ2)), where
the hidden constant depends on the game matrix A only.
Corollary 9. For a fixed δ, let S ≡ S(0) ∈ Rm+n be a measurable subset in R(δ). Suppose that MWU
are used by both players to play a zero-sum game which is non-trivial, with either
• constant step-size satisfying the bound in Theorem 8; or
• diminishing step-sizes satisfying limt→∞ ǫt = 0 and
ǫ1 < min

 14 ·H(δ/2) , δ9 · minz≥δ/2
i and j∈Si
h′′ij(z)

 and lim supt→∞
∑t
τ=1(ǫτ )
2
log t
>
16(m+ n)
∆(δ)2 · c(A)2
Then there exists a starting point in S such that its flow will eventually reach the outside of R(δ);
consequently, there is a dense set of starting points which their flows will eventually reach the outside
of R(δ).
6 Generalization to Graphical Constant-sum Games
Graphical Constant-sum Games. Next, we consider a striking generalization of two-person zero-
sum game, in which there can be many players. We use i or i• to denote a player, and j or j• to denote
a strategy. In a game with m players, we number the players by 1, 2, · · · ,m, and let Si denote the
strategy set of Player i, and ni := |Si|. All variables in the primal space are now denoted by xij, and
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hence we denote the concatenation of all variables by x. Again, we denote the variables in the dual
space by r.
A game with m players is a graphical polymatrix game if the game is defined as follows: on an
undirected graph H = ([m], EH), each edge (i1, i2) ∈ EH corresponds to a bimatrix game between
Players i1 and i2 with strategy sets Si1 and Si2 respectively. It is worth noting that the strategy set of
a Player i in different bimatrix games is the same, and every time she plays the game, she must choose
the same mixed strategy for all these bimatrix games. The payoff of a Player i is the sum of payoffs she
received from the bimatrix games she involves. Such a game is a graphical constant-sum game if the
bimatrix game corresponded by every edge (i1, i2) ∈ E is a two-person constant-sum game (different
bimatrix games may have different constants). WLOG, we assume that each bimatrix game is indeed
zero-sum.
Analysis. As we have already seen in Section 4, the key is to show that the value of second-order
coefficient C(r) is above zero. The rest of the analysis amounts to bounding ǫ to make sure that the
effects of higher order terms are insignificant and det(M) is strictly positive.
For each zero-sum game corresponding to edge (i1, i2), let Mi1,i2 denote the M-matrix as if there
were only these two players playing this zero-sum game. A crucial observation is:
since the payoffs of a player is simply
the sum of all her payoffs in the bimatrix games which she involves,
if we focus on the sub-squared-matrix of M corresponding to Players i1 and i2,
it is exactly Mi1i2.
By (4), the above observation leads to the following:
the second-order coefficient in det(M) is
exactly equal to the second-order coefficient in
∑
(i1,i2)∈EH det(Mi1i2).
Recall that in Lemma 3, we have already shown that the second-order coefficient in each det(Mi1i2)
is non-negative. Thus, we have proved that C(r) ≥ 0, while equality holds if and only if every edge
corresponds to a trivial zero-sum game of the form (9).
Accordingly, we say a graphical constant-sum game is non-trivial if at least one of the two-person
constant-sum games corresponded by an edge is non-trivial.
We can define R(δ) in a similar manner as in Section 4.1. Same as in Section 4.1, a strictly positive
lower bound on C(r) in R(δ) can be derived for non-trivial game. For simplicity, we denote this lower
bound by C¯(δ).
However, unlike in a two-person zero-sum game, the coefficients of ǫ3 and other odd powers of ǫ in
det(M) can be non-zero. So we need to derive a new bound on higher-order terms. Let n =
∑m
i=1 ni.
By expanding the determinant using the Leibniz formula, we have
det(M)− 1 ≥ C¯(δ) · ǫ2 −
∞∑
i=3
(
n
i
)
i!(2ǫ)i ≥ C¯(δ) · ǫ2 − ǫ2.5 [(2n)3ǫ0.5 + (2n)4ǫ1.5 + (2n)5ǫ2.5 + · · · ] .
When ǫ ≤ 1/(64n6), we have (2n)3ǫ0.5 + (2n)4ǫ1.5 + (2n)5ǫ2.5 + · · · ≤ √2. Consequently, when ǫ ≤
min{1/(64n6) , C¯(δ)2/8}, we have det(M) ≥ 1 + C¯(δ)2 · ǫ2.
The analysis for diminishing step-sizes can also be extended easily. Indeed, the only modification
needed is to replace the upper bound 1/4 on ǫ to 1/(4d¯), where d¯ is the maximum degree of the graph
underlying the game, so as to guarantee that MWU is injective and M is strictly diagonally dominant
(see Appendices B and C.1).
Theorem 10. For a fixed δ, let S ≡ S(0) ∈ Rn be a measurable subset in R(δ). Suppose that the
underlying graphical constant-sum game is non-trivial. Then C¯(δ) > 0.
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Suppose that MWU are used by all players with step-size satisfying
ǫ ≤ min
{
1
64n6
,
C¯(δ)2
8
}
.
Let T be a time such that for all t ∈ {0} ∪ [T − 1], S(t) ⊂ R(δ). Then for any t ∈ [T ],
volume(S(t)) ≥
(
1 +
C¯(δ)
2
· ǫ2
)t
· volume(S).
Corollary 11. For a fixed δ, let S ≡ S(0) ⊂ Rn be a measurable subset in R(δ). Suppose that MWU
are used by all players in a non-trivial graphical constant-sum game, with either
• constant step-size ǫ ≤ min{1/(64n6) , C¯(δ)2/8}; or
• diminishing step-size satisfying
ǫ1 <
1
4d¯
and lim
t→∞ ǫt = 0 and lim supt→∞
∑t
τ=1(ǫτ )
2
log t
>
4n
C¯(δ)
,
where d¯ is the maximum degree of the graph H.
Then there exists a starting point in S such that before some finite time, its flow reaches the outside
of R(δ). Consequently, there is a dense set of starting points in R(δ) which their flows will eventually
reach the outside of R(δ).
7 Non-Zero-Sum Games: Generalized Rock-Paper-Scissors Games
Consider the Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) game with payoff matrices (A,AT), where
A =

 0 P −Q−Q 0 P
P −Q 0

 , with P,Q ≥ 0. (12)
This family of games are neither zero-sum nor strictly competitive when P 6= Q.4
Suppose both players employ MWU to play the game. Since the dimension is small, computing
det(M) explicitly is easy (say, by using math software). Let C1 := 2P
2+2Q2+5PQ and C2 := (P−Q)2.
Let a = e
p1 , b = e
p2 , c = e
p3 , d = e
q1 , e = e
q2 and f = e
q3 . We have
det(M) = 1+ǫ2 ·
[
C1(abdf + abef + acde+ acef + bcde+ bcdf)− C2(abde+ acdf + bcef)
(a+ b+ c)2(d+ e+ f)2
]
+ O(ǫ4).
Recall that after transformation G, x1 = a/(a+ b+ c), y1 = d/(d+ e+ f), and other xj and yk can be
computed similarly. Thus, we can rewrite the second-order coefficient C(r) in two different forms:[
C1
(
x3
x2
+
x3
x1
)
− C2
]
x1x2y1y2 +
[
C1
(
x2
x1
+
x2
x3
)
− C2
]
x1x3y1y3 +
[
C1
(
x1
x2
+
x1
x3
)
− C2
]
x2x3y2y3[
C1
(
y3
y1
+
y3
y2
)
− C2
]
x1x2y1y2 +
[
C1
(
y2
y1
+
y2
y3
)
− C2
]
x1x3y1y3 +
[
C1
(
y1
y2
+
y1
y3
)
− C2
]
x2x3y2y3.
A necessary (but not sufficient) condition for C(r) ≤ 0 is both of the followings hold:
(A) one of x1x2 ,
x2
x3
, x3x1 or their reciprocals is less than
C2
2C1
= (1−r)
2
4+10r+4r2 , where r := Q/P ;
4To see why, assume P < Q. Suppose x = y = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), then the expected payoffs of both players are
(P −Q)/3. However, if both players switch to (1− 2κ, κ, κ) for some tiny κ, the expected payoffs of both players will be
(4κ− 2κ2)(P −Q), which is strictly larger than (P −Q)/3 when κ is sufficiently small. The case P > Q is symmetric.
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(B) one of y1y2 ,
y2
y3
, y3y1 or their reciprocals is less than
C2
2C1
.
Accordingly, let W denote the collection of all points (p,q) in the dual space such that the corre-
sponding (x,y) satisfy the negations of both (A) and (B).5 Then x1 ≥ 1/(1+4C1/C2);6 the same lower
bound holds for other xj, yk too. Thus, in W , we can lower bound C by the AM-GM inequality:
1
(1 + 4C1/C2)4
·
[
C1
(
x3
x2
+
x3
x1
+
x2
x1
+
x2
x3
+
x1
x2
+
x1
x3
)
− 3C2
]
≥ 6C1 − 3C2
(1 + 4C1/C2)4
.
Note that this bound is strictly positive as 6C1 > 3C2 always.
By observing that outside W , at least one of x1, x2, x3, y1, y2, y3 must be strictly less than
C2
2C1+C2
,7
and by bounding the higher order terms in det(M) appropriately, we can use the proof technique behind
Corollaries 5 and 6 to derive the theorem below.
Theorem 12. Suppose two players employ MWU to play RPS game (12). Let w be an interior point
in W , let N(w) ⊂W be a neighbourhood around w with positive volume. If both players use either
• constant step-size ǫ satisfying ǫ ≤ min
{
1
2592 ,
6C1−3C2
2(1+4C1/C2)4
}
; or
• a sequence of diminishing step-sizes {ǫt} satisfying
ǫ1 <
1
4
and lim
t→∞ ǫt = 0 and lim supt→∞
∑t
τ=1(ǫτ )
2
log t
>
8(1 + 4C1/C2)
4
2C1 −C2 ,
then there exists a finite time T such that the flow of N(w) at time T does not lie entirely within W .
Consequently, there is a dense subset of starting points in W , such that the flow of each of them will
eventually reach a point such that one of x1, x2, x3, y1, y2, y3 is strictly less than
C2
2C1+C2
.
We discuss an interpretation of Theorem 12. Take w be the NE. The table below lists some concrete
values of C22C1+C2 =
(1−r)2
5+8r+5r2
for different values of r = Q/P . Note that all the values are significantly
below 13 ≈ 0.333, the value in all entries of the NE. Theorem 12 implies that the flow of a dense set of
starting points in any open neighbourhood of the NE will eventually get quite far away from the NE.
This is a global instability result, in contrast with the classical local instability analysis which linearise
the dynamic near the NE locally and compute the unstable and stable manifolds.
r 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 2
C2
2C1+C2
0.0244 0.00690 0.00274 0.000615 0 0.000504 0.00183 0.00377 0.0244
We present a slightly stronger version of the above theorem in Appendix E, which states that for di-
minishing step-sizes, the conclusion can actually be improved to: for any κ > 0, two of x1, x2, x3, y1, y2, y3
are strictly less than C22C1+C2 + κ.
8 Non-Zero-Sum Games: 2× 2 Bimatrix Games
We consider general 2×2 bimatrix game here. It is well-known that after a reduction of game matrices,
we can consider the following games only:
A =
[
0 R1
R2 0
]
B =
[
0 R3
R4 0
]
5Some readers might feel uncomfortable that we require the negations of both (A) and (B) to hold, since this seems
stronger than needed. Our choice is conscious, as we will need both conditions for giving a good lower bound on C(r).
6This follows from x1 +
2C1
C2
x1 +
2C1
C2
x1 ≥ x1 + x2 + x3 = 1.
7For instance, say x1/x2 <
C2
2C1
, then we have x1/(1− x1) <
C2
2C1
, which leads to x1 <
C2
2C1+C2
.
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In this case, it is more convenient to use a transformation of RD by [11], as it will eliminate all O(ǫ3)
terms. We describe this transformation for two-person general-sum games.
Number the strategies of Player 1 by {1, 2 · · · , n} and those of Player 2 by {1, 2, · · · ,m}, where
n,m ≥ 2. Let fj := lnxj − lnxn for j ∈ [n − 1], and let gk = ln yk − ln ym for k ∈ [m − 1]. Let
f = (f1, f2, · · · , fn−1) and g = (g1, g2, · · · , gm−1) denote the dual variables. The dimension of the dual
space is n +m − 2. We also let fn, gm ≡ 0, but keep in mind that they are not variables in the dual
space. Note that the variables x,y before transformation can be recovered from f ,g as follows:
xj =
e
fj∑n
ℓ=1 e
fℓ
yk =
e
gk∑m
ℓ=1 e
gℓ
Then we have the following form of RD:
dfj
dt
=
m∑
ℓ=1
(Ajℓ −Anℓ) · e
gℓ∑m
z=1 e
gz
;
dgk
dt
=
n∑
ℓ=1
(Bℓk −Bℓm) · e
fℓ∑n
z=1 e
fz
.
The Jacobian of the system is an (n +m− 2) × (n +m− 2)-squared matrix with all diagonal entries
zero.
Back to 2×2 bimatrix game. The Jacobian is a 2×2 matrix for which we can compute its determinant
directly:
det(M) = 1− ef1eg1 (R1 +R2)(R3 +R4)ǫ2.
In other words, the volume is globally strictly increasing if and only if (R1 +R2)(R3 +R4) < 0. When
R1 = −R2 or R3 = −R4, the volume is preserved even with the discrete updates.
One should note that, however, while globally strictly increasing volume implies reaching boundary,
globally strictly decreasing volume does not imply the opposite. When R1 > −R2 > 0, and R3+R4 > 0,
the volume is decreasing, but since the first strategy of Player 1 is a strictly dominating strategy of
her, it follows that f1 ր∞.
The only scenarios when the game has a unique NE which is fully mixed is when R1, R2 have the
same sign, R3, R4 have the same sign, and R1, R3 have different signs. In this case, volume is globally
strictly increasing, indicating the fully mixed NE is globally unstable.
Acknowledgements
Yun Kuen Cheung and Georgios Piliouras acknowledge SUTD grant SRG ESD 2015 097, MOE AcRF
Tier 2 Grant 2016-T2-1-170, grant PIE-SGP-AI-2018-01 and NRF 2018 Fellowship NRF-NRFF2018-07.
References
[1] Robert John Aumann. Game theory. In The new Palgrave: a dictionary of economics, pages
460–482. London (UK) Macmillan, 1987.
[2] James P. Bailey and Georgios Piliouras. Multiplicative weights update in zero-sum games. In EC,
pages 321–338, 2018.
[3] D. Balduzzi, S. Racaniere, J. Martens, J. Foerster, K. Tuyls, and T. Graepel. The Mechanics of
n-Player Differentiable Games. In ICML, 2018.
[4] G.W. Brown. Iterative solutions of games by fictitious play. In Activity Analysis of Production
and Allocation, T.C. Koopmans (Ed.), New York: Wiley., 1951.
17
[5] Nikolo Cesa-Bianchi and Gabor Lugoisi. Prediction, Learning, and Games. Cambridge University
Press, 2006.
[6] Yun Kuen Cheung. Multiplicative weights updates with constant step-size in graphical constant-
sum games. In NeurIPS 2018, pages 3532–3542, 2018.
[7] Thiparat Chotibut, Fryderyk Falniowski, Michal Misiurewicz, and Georgios Piliouras. Family of
chaotic maps from game theory. arXiv preprint arXiv:1807.06831, 2018.
[8] Constantinos Daskalakis, Andrew Ilyas, Vasilis Syrgkanis, and Haoyang Zeng. Training gans with
optimism. In ICLR, 2018.
[9] Constantinos Daskalakis and Ioannis Panageas. The limit points of (optimistic) gradient descent in
min-max optimization. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, pages 9256–9266,
2018.
[10] Constantinos Daskalakis and Ioannis Panageas. Last-iterate convergence: Zero-sum games and
constrained min-max optimization. ITCS, 2019.
[11] I. Eshel and E. Akin. Coevolutionary instability of mixed nash solutions. Journal of Mathematical
Biology, 18:123–133, 1983.
[12] Yoav Freund and Robert E. Schapire. Game theory, on-line prediction and boosting. In COLT,
pages 325–332, 1996.
[13] Tobias Galla and J. Doyne Farmer. Complex dynamics in learning complicated games. PNAS,
110(4):1232–1236, 2013.
[14] Gauthier Gidel, Reyhane Askari Hemmat, Mohammad Pezeshki, Gabriel Huang, Remi Lepriol,
Simon Lacoste-Julien, and Ioannis Mitliagkas. Negative momentum for improved game dynamics.
In AISTATS, 2019.
[15] Ian J. Goodfellow, Jean Pouget-Abadie, Mehdi Mirza, Bing Xu, David Warde-Farley, Sherjil Ozair,
Aaron Courville, and Yoshua Bengio. Generative adversarial nets. In Proceedings of the 27th
International Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems - Volume 2, NIPS’14, pages
2672–2680, Cambridge, MA, USA, 2014. MIT Press.
[16] Ralph Howard. The inverse function theorem for lipschitz maps.
http://people.math.sc.edu/howard/Notes/inverse.pdf, 1997.
[17] Tien-Yien Li and James A. Yorke. Period three implies chaos. The American Mathematical
Monthly, 82(10):985–992, 1975.
[18] P. Mertikopoulos, H. Zenati, B. Lecouat, C.-S. Foo, V. Chandrasekhar, and G. Piliouras. Mirror
descent in saddle-point problems: Going the extra (gradient) mile. ArXiv e-prints, July 2018.
[19] Panayotis Mertikopoulos, Christos Papadimitriou, and Georgios Piliouras. Cycles in adversarial
regularized learning. In ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2018.
[20] Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden, Eva Tardos, and Vijay V. Vazirani. Algorithmic Game Theory.
Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, USA, 2007.
[21] Brynjulf Owren. Volume preserving methods. https://wiki.math.ntnu.no/_media/aarms2015/lectures/volumepreservation.pdf,
2015.
[22] Gerasimos Palaiopanos, Ioannis Panageas, and Georgios Piliouras. Multiplicative weights update
with constant step-size in congestion games: Convergence, limit cycles and chaos. In NIPS, pages
5874–5884, 2017.
[23] Georgios Piliouras and Leonard J. Schulman. Learning dynamics and the co-evolution of competing
sexual species. In ITCS, 2018.
18
[24] Georgios Piliouras and Jeff S. Shamma. Optimization despite chaos: Convex relaxations to complex
limit sets via poincare´ recurrence. In SODA, pages 861–873, 2014.
[25] J. Robinson. An iterative method of solving a game. Annals of Mathematics, 54:296–301, 1951.
[26] Tim Roughgarden. Twenty lectures on algorithmic game theory. Cambridge University Press,
2016.
[27] Yuzuru Sato, Eizo Akiyama, and J. Doyne Farmer. Chaos in learning a simple two-person game.
PNAS, 99(7):4748–4751, 2002.
[28] John von Neumann. Zur theorie der gesellschaftsspiele. Mathematische Annalen, 100:295–300,
1928.
[29] John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton
University Press, 1944.
[30] Y. Yazıcı, C.-S. Foo, S. Winkler, K.-H. Yap, G. Piliouras, and V. Chandrasekhar. The Unusual
Effectiveness of Averaging in GAN Training. ArXiv e-prints, June 2018.
[31] H Peyton Young. Strategic learning and its limits. Oxford Univ. Press, 2004.
19
A Figure 1
The game used is a classical zero-sum game called Matching-Pennies. The payoff matrix for Player 1 is
A =
[
1 0
0 1
]
We use the transformation of [11]; see Section 8.
In the dual space, the Nash equilibrium point is at (0, 0), the origin. We consider two neighbourhoods
of starting points. In the left figure, the neighbourhood is centred at the Nash equilibrium with ℓ∞-
radius being 0.05. In the right figure, the neighbourhood is centred at the point (0.2, 0.15), and again
the ℓ∞-radius is 0.05.
In both cases, we use MWU algorithm with step-size ǫ = 0.1. The evolved sets are coloured dark-
green, orange, purple, lime, pink, blue and red in chronological order. In the left figure, the evolved sets
are captured at times 0, 500, 1000, 1500, 2000, 2500, 3000 respectively. In the right figure, the evolved
sets are captured at times 0, 300, 600, 900, 1200, 1500, 1800 respectively.
In the left figure, an outer region strictly contains an inner region, so it shows that the volume
expands. Also, as time goes, the shape of the region goes from square-like to tornado like.
In the right figure, the regions move in clockwise direction around the origin. Their shapes get
thinner, while their diameters grow quickly, indicating that chaos are occurring.
B MWU Algorithm is Injective in Graphical Polymatrix Games
All norms we used here are ℓ∞ norms.
Recall that d¯ is the maximum degree of the graph underlying the graphical polymatrix game. For
two-person general-sum game, d¯ = 1.
Suppose the contrary that there are two points r1 and r2 such that they map to the same point r
′
after one round of MWU. Since the payoff received by each player is within the interval of ±d¯, we have
‖r1 − r′‖, ‖r2 − r′‖ ≤ d¯ǫ, and hence ‖r1 − r2‖ ≤ 2d¯ǫ. Our target is then to derive a contradiction by
showing that within the ball B(r1+r22 , d¯ǫ), MWU is injective; observe that this ball includes both r1, r2.
We will use the following version of inverse function theorem [16, Theorem 3.1]:
Theorem 13. Let X,Y be Banach spaces equipped with norms ‖ · ‖X, ‖ · ‖Y respectively. Let B(x0, r0)
be a closed ball in X. Let f : B(x0, r0) → Y be a function so that for some invertible linear map
L : X→ Y and some ρ < 1,
‖L−1 · f(x2)− L−1 · f(x1)− (x2 − x1)‖X ≤ ρ · ‖x2 − x1‖X.
Then f is injective on B(x0, r0).
For our purpose, X,Y are identical Euclidean space, both equipped with ℓ∞ norm. Take L to be
the identity map. Then for any ra, rb in the ball B(
r1+r2
2 , d¯ǫ), we have
‖L−1 · f(rb)− L−1 · f(ra)− (rb − ra)‖ = ‖rb + ǫ · E(rb)− ra + ǫ · E(ra)− (rb − ra)‖
= ǫ‖E(rb)− E(ra)‖.
Suppose that ‖ra− rb‖ = κ. Then observe that when mapped back to the primal space, every entry
in x(ra) will be within a multiplicative factor of e
2κ of the corresponding entry in x(rb). Thus, when
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we focus on the entry of E that corresponds to Player i and her strategy j, we have
|Eij(rb)−Eij(ra)| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
(i,ℓ)∈EH
∑
k∈Sℓ
Aiℓjk · [xℓk(rb)− xℓk(ra)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
(i,ℓ)∈EH
∑
k∈Sℓ
1 · (e2κ − 1)xℓk(rb)
≤
∑
(i,ℓ)∈EH
(e2κ − 1)
≤ d¯(e2κ − 1) ≤ 4d¯κ,
where the final inequality holds when we assume d¯ǫ < 1/4, so that 2κ ≤ 4d¯ǫ < 1 and hence e2κ−1 ≤ 4κ.
Consequently, ǫ‖E(rb) − E(ra)‖ ≤ 4d¯ǫκ. For the condition required in the above theorem to hold,
it suffices to restrict that 4d¯ǫ < 1, i.e., ǫ < 1/(4d¯).
C Two-person Zero-sum Games
C.1 Diminishing Step-Sizes
Here, we consider the case when the step-sizes used by both players are not constants. For simplicity, we
here assume that both players use the same diminishing step-sizes {ǫt}. Also, we assume that ǫ1 < 1/4
and limt→∞ ǫt = 0. Let t0 be the first time such that ǫt ≤ ǫ¯(δ). Then the inequality in Theorem 4 can
be replaced by: for any t ≥ t0,
volume(S(t)) ≥
[
t∏
τ=t0+1
(
1 +
δ2 · c(A)2
8
· (ǫτ )2
)]
· volume(S(t0)).
To proceed, we need to argue that if volume(S(0)) is strictly positive, then volume(S(t0)) is also strictly
positive. In Appendix C.2, we will prove that when ǫ < 1/4, the matrix M is strictly diagonally domi-
nant; then by a use of Levy-Desplanques theorem, we can show that det(M) is strictly positive. Thus,
when S(0) has positive measure, volume(S(1)) =
∫
S(0) det(M) dV remains strictly positive. Inductively,
we arrive at the conclusion that volume(S(t0)) remains strictly positive for any finite t0.
Next, note that
log
[
t∏
τ=t0
(
1 +
δ2 · c(A)2
8
· (ǫτ )2
)]
≥ δ
2 · c(A)2
16
·
t∑
τ=t0
(ǫτ )
2.
If the summation is ω(log t), then volume(S(t)) = ω(poly(t)). By the logic identical to that in Section 4.2,
the conclusion in Corollary 5 applies when the step-sizes are diminishing gently. The next theorem
describes the precise conditions required on {ǫt}.
C.2 M is Strictly Diagonally Dominant
For each j ∈ J , Mjj = 1, for any j′ ∈ J and j′ 6= j, Mjj′ = 0, and
∑
k∈K
Mjk =
∑
k∈K
ǫyk(Ajk − [Ay]j) = ǫ
∑
k∈K
ykAjk − ǫ[Ay]j = ǫ[Ay]j − ǫ[Ay]j = 0.
Thus, ∑
j′∈J, j′ 6=j
|Mjj′ | +
∑
k∈K
|Mjk| = 2
∑
k∈K,Mjk>0
Mjk
= 2
∑
k∈K,Mjk>0
ǫyk(Ajk − [Ay]j) ≤ 2
∑
k∈K,Mjk>0
ǫ · yk · 2 ≤ 4ǫ.
21
Consequently, when ǫ < 1/4, the matrix M is strictly diagonally dominant.
By Levy-Desplanques theorem, M = M(ǫ) is non-singular for any ǫ ∈ [0, 1/4). Thus, det(M(ǫ)) is
non-zero for any ǫ ∈ [0, 1/4).
Now, suppose the contrary that det(M(ǫ′)) ≤ 0 for some ǫ′ ∈ [0, 1/4). Since det(M(ǫ)) is a con-
tinuous function w.r.t. ǫ, by the intermediate value theorem, there exists an ǫ′′ ∈ [0, ǫ′] such that
det(M(ǫ′′)) = 0, a contradiction.
D Follow-The-Regularized-Leader Dynamics
D.1 Deriving (11)
By standard calculus, we have
∃ v ∈ R such that ∀j ∈ Si, ptij − h′ij(xij) = v.
Suppose we increment ptij by a tiny amount ∆, and we want to see how xi changes. Suppose that xi is
changed to x∗i , and for each ℓ ∈ Si, x∗iℓ − xiℓ =: δℓ. In the first order arithmetic, we have
∀ℓ ∈ Si \ {j}, ∆− h′′ij(xij) · δj = −h′′iℓ(xiℓ) · δℓ and
∑
ℓ∈Si
δℓ = 0.
Note that the above equalities form a linear system with variables {δℓ}. It can be solved easily. Let
H :=
∑
ℓ∈Si 1/h
′′(xiℓ). We have
δj =
(H − 1/h′′(xij))
H · h′′(xij) ·∆ and ∀ℓ ∈ Si \ {j}, δℓ = −
1
H · h′′(xij) · h′′(xiℓ) ·∆.
Consequently, we have
∂xij
∂pj
=
(H − 1/h′′(xij))
H · h′′(xij) and ∀ℓ ∈ Si \ {j},
∂xiℓ
∂pj
= − 1
H · h′′(xij) · h′′(xiℓ) .
D.2 FTRL Algorithm is Injective in Two-Person General-Sum Games
As was done in Appendix B, to show that the algorithm is injective, it suffices to show that FTRL
algorithm is injective inside the ball we introduced in Appendix B. Here d¯ = 1. Recall that notation
r = (p,q) for two-person general-sum games.
To use Theorem 13, again we take X,Y be identical Euclidean space, both equipped with ℓ∞ norm.
This time, L is set to be u−1I, for some u > 0 which we determine later. Then we have
‖L−1 · f(rb)− L−1 · f(ra)− (rb − ra)‖ ≤ ǫu‖E(rb)− E(ra)‖+ (1− u)‖rb − ra‖.
Suppose that ‖rb− ra‖ = κ. To bound the term in RHS, we consider the line segment from ra to rb,
which is parametrized by [0, 1]. Recall the matrix M which we computed in Section 5. For any j ∈ J ,
k ∈ K, Mjk is actually ǫ · ∂Ej∂qk . Then we have
u
∣∣∣Eij(rb)− Eij(ra)∣∣∣ = u · ∫ 1
0
(∑
k∈K
∂Ej
∂qk
· (qbk − qak)
)
dz
≤ κu ·
∫ 1
0
∣∣∣∣∣∑
k∈K
∂Ej
∂qk
∣∣∣∣∣ dz (since ‖ra − rb‖∞ ≤ κ)
≤ κu ·
∫ 1
0
∑
k∈K
∣∣∣∣∣y¯k ·
(
Ajk −
∑
ℓ∈K
Ajℓ · y¯ℓ∑
z∈K y¯z
)∣∣∣∣∣ dz
≤ 2κu ·
∫ 1
0
∑
k∈K
y¯k dz.
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Thus, by setting u to be the inverse of the maximum value of
∑
k∈K y¯k in the ball, we have
u
∣∣∣Eij(rb)− Eij(ra)∣∣∣ ≤ 2κ, and hence u‖E(rb)− E(ra)‖ ≤ 2κ.
Then by restricting ǫ ≤ u/4, we have
ǫu‖E(rb)−E(ra)‖+ (1− h)‖rb − ra‖ < uκ/2 + (1− u)κ = (1− u/2)κ.
Thus, we can set the parameter ρ in Theorem 13 to be 1− u/2.
We still need to provide a concrete value of u. Towards this, for any δ > 0, we define
H(δ) := max
r∈R(δ)
max

∑
j∈J
x¯j ,
∑
k∈K
y¯k

 .
Suppose that ra, rb ∈ R(δ). It is actually possible that the line segment between ra and rb does
not fully lie within R(δ), i.e., R(δ) is not convex. Therefore, u might need to be strictly smaller than
1/H(δ).
By (11), to minimize xij , pij should be pushed to as small as possible, while piℓ for ℓ 6= j should
be pushed to as large as possible. Therefore, for a fixed j, we consider the line segment L between
the two points ra and rc := ra − 2ǫeij + 2ǫ
∑
ℓ∈J\{j} eiℓ, and parametrized the segment by [0, 1]. Since
ra ∈ R(δ), xaij ≥ δ. Then by (11), for any rd on the line segment, the value of xdij can be lower bounded
using the following integral for some τ ∈ [0, 1]:
δ −
∫ τ
0

2ǫx¯ij − 2ǫ [x¯ij ]2
H
+ 2ǫ
∑
ℓ∈J\{j}
x¯ijx¯iℓ
H

 dz ≥ δ − 4ǫ ·max
r∈L
x¯ij(r) = δ − 4ǫ ·max
r∈L
1
h′′ij(xij)
.
By imposing that
ǫ ≤ δ
9
· min
z≥δ/2
h′′ij(z),
the above inequality guarantees that all points in L has xij value at least δ/2.
By assumptions on h, the upper bound on ǫ is strictly positive, yet it can be arbitrarily close to
zero, since there is nothing to prohibit that h′′ij(z) being tiny (but positive) for a particular z ≥ δ/2.
For instance, one may construct a regularizer hij such that h
′′
ij(z) ≈ 0 for all z ≥ α, but when z < α
the value h′′ij(z) gets much larger so that limzց0 h
′
ij(z) = −∞. Then all three conditions on h which
we stated in Section 5 hold.
Of course, the above constructed regularizer is quite unnatural, so one should be able to improve
our bounds for a more natural regularizer. Our key concern here, however, is just to provide a strictly
positive upper bound on ǫ, for any δ > 0. (The upper bound can depend on δ.)
Anyway, by having the restriction on ǫ, we can set u to be H(δ/2). In sum, we need the restriction
ǫ ≤ min

 14 ·H(δ/2) , δ9 · minz≥δ/2
i and j∈Si
h′′ij(z)

 .
D.3 Analysis for Two-person Zero-sum Games
Again, we need to bound the higher order terms. As in Section 4.1, for each min{n,m} ≥ i ≥ 2, there
are at most
(
n
i
) · (mi ) · (i!)2 terms in the summation of the Leibniz formula with factor ǫ2i. Each of such
terms is a product of 2i off-diagonal entries of M, and its absolute value can be bounded as∣∣∣∣∣
i∏
a=1
i∏
b=1
MjakbMkbja
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
(
i∏
a=1
x¯ja
)
·
(
i∏
b=1
y¯kb
)
· (2ǫ)2i.
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Note that all ja’s are distinct, while all kb’s are also distinct.
By the AM-GM inequality, the RHS of the above inequality can be bounded by(∑i
a=1 x¯ja
)i (∑i
b=1 y¯kb
)i
i2i
· (2ǫ)2i ≤ (H(δ) · ǫ)2i .
Overall, the sum of all terms with factor ǫ2i is bounded by(
n
i
)
·
(
m
i
)
· (i!)2 · (H(δ) · ǫ)2i ≤ (H(δ) · ǫ√nm)2i.
Following the calculations in Section 4.1, we impose an upper bound of
ǫ ≤ 1
2 ·max{2,H(δ)}4 · n2m2 .
We will also need the following quantity to bound the gap when applied the Cauchy-Schwarz in-
equality. Let ∆(δ) denote the minimum possible value in the shadow distributions of any (x,y) = G(r),
where r ∈ R(δ). We note that ∆(δ) is strictly positive for any δ. Then in R(δ), we have
C ≥ ∆(δ)
2c(A)2
4
.
Thus, Theorem 4 holds for FTRL too, after replacing the upper bound on ǫ appropriately. This
yields Theorem 8.
In Appendix C.1, we concern MWU with diminishing step-sizes. For FTRL with diminishing step-
sizes, the analysis is essentially the same, except that we need a slightly different argument to show
that volume(S(t0)) is strictly positive.
Consider a matrixM′ obtained fromM by the following operations: for each j ∈ J , divide all entries
in the j-column by
(∑
ℓ∈J x¯ℓ
)
, and for each k ∈ K, divide all entries in the k-column by (∑ℓ∈K y¯ℓ).
Note that
det(M′) =
(∑
ℓ∈J
x¯ℓ
)−|J |(∑
ℓ∈K
y¯ℓ
)−|K|
· det(M).
So for showing that det(M) is strictly positive, it suffices to show that det(M′) is strictly positive.
The advantage of using M′ is that it allows us to reuse the calculations in Appendix C.2 (by
appropriately replacing x,y with x¯, y¯) to show that when ǫ < 1/(4 · H(δ)), M′ is strictly diagonally
dominant and hence det(M′),det(M) are both strictly positive. Thus, Corollary 6 holds for FTRL too,
by replacing the upper bound on ǫ1 with appropriately, yielding Corollary 9.
E A Stronger Theorem for the Generalized Rock-Paper-Scissors Games
We can derive a slightly stronger theorem than Theorem 12. Here, we only present the result for
diminishing step-sizes.
For any κ, δ > 0, let Wκ,δ denote the collection of all points (p,q) in the dual space such that the
corresponding (x,y) satisfy either of the following two conditions:
• all of x1x2 ,
x2
x3
, x3x1 and their reciprocals are larger than or equal to
C2
2C1
+ κ, and at least two of the
three entries in y are larger than or equal to δ; or
• all of y1y2 ,
y2
y3
, y3y1 and their reciprocals are larger than or equal to
C2
2C1
+ κ, and at least two of the
three entries in x are larger than or equal to δ.
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To understand why Wκ,δ is defined as above, we suppose the first condition above holds. WLOG,
assume y1, y2 ≥ δ. Then in the first form of C, the second and third terms are non-negative, while the
first term satisfies [
C1
(
x3
x2
+
x3
x1
)
− C2
]
x1x2y1y2 ≥ 2C2κ · 1
(1 + 4C1/C2)2
· δ2.
Thus, the RHS of the above inequality can serve as a lower bound for C. Similarly, the same lower
bound for C holds if the second condition holds. Therefore, whenever one of the two conditions hold,
we have a strictly positive lower bound for C. Following the logic behind Theorem 12, we have the
following theorem.
Theorem 14. Suppose two players employ MWU to play the RPS game (12). For any κ, δ > 0, let
w be an interior point in Wκ,δ, let N(w) ⊂ Wκ,δ be a neighbourhood around w with strictly positive
volume. If both players use a sequence of diminishing step-sizes {ǫt} satisfying
ǫ1 <
1
4
and lim
t→∞ ǫt = 0 and lim supt→∞
∑t
τ=1(ǫτ )
2
log t
>
12(1 + 4C1/C2)
2
C2κδ2
,
then there exists a finite time T such that the flow of N(w) at time T does not lie entirely within Wκ,δ.
Consequently, there is a dense subset of starting points in Wκ,δ, such that the flow of each of them will
eventually reach a point such that one of the following holds:
• one of x1, x2, x3 is strictly less than C22C1+C2+κ, and one of y1, y2, y3 is strictly less than
C2
2C1+C2
+κ;
or
• two of x1, x2, x3 are strictly less than δ; or
• two of y1, y2, y3 are strictly less than δ.
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